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THE MICRO-MACRO LEGAL CONTINUUM AND THE LEVELS OF LAW
William Rhee*
What is the relationship between individualand collective /egal action?
How does a single lawsuit, a single statute, a solitary administrative
regulation, ora jpecaicexecutive orderact/ega/doctrine?Moregenerally,
what about the broaderlaw? In an attempt to answer that question, this
essay articulatestwo interrelatedconcepts: the micro-maro legal continuum
and the levels of law.
First, the miCro-macro legal continuum demonstrates how the type of
law can affct legal actors'propssionaljudgment and decision-making.
Parallelingthe division between microeconomics and macroeconomics, the
porous boundary between micro law andmacro law is dictated bj different
lega/ ro/es. Whereas legal actorspracting micro law are more limited
in theirjudgment and decision-making, legal actors engaging macro law
can exercise greater independentjudgment and dedsion-making. Whie

practitionerstend to engage more micro law and academics more macro
law, this need not always be the case.
Second, both micro and macro law can impact society at three diferent
levels. These three levels of law parallelthe three levels of military art.
The lowest level, the tacticallevel of law, ficuses solely upon the people
directly impacted by the particularlaw. Conversely, the highest level, the
strategic level of law, is concerned with the broaderpolicy implications
beyond thepeople directly impactedby theparticularlaw. The intermediate
*

Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University. Because the author is an American
lawyer and law professor, the vast majority of examples in this essay are from American
legal sources. That being said, however, the ideas in this essay hopefully should apply
equally to the Indian legal system and other democratic legal systems. Furthermore,
some of the ideas in this essay are also discussed in a forthcoming article. Will Rhee,
Law and Practice, 9 LEGAL COMIM. & RITFTORTC (2012). The author thanks Atiba Ellis,
Jena Martin-Amerson, Sean Tu and Adriane Williams for their outstanding comments
and Vrinda Bhandari, Priya Urs and the rest of the Board of the Socio-Legal Review
for their superb editing. All errors are the author's sole responsibility. Additional
comments are welcome at william.rheegmail.wvu.edu.

1

Vol. 8 (2)

2012

Soio-Legal Review

level, the operationallevel of law, links the tacticalandstrategiclevels. The
operationallevel of law uses micro law to change or to develop macro law.
Together the micro-macro legal continuum and the three levels of law
provide an alternative legal problem-soling framework more accurate
than current less sophisticatedapproaches such as the so-called 'great
disconnect" between the legal academy and legalpractice. Although this
alternativelegaljramework requiresrefinementand empiricaltesting, it can
help develop a new "law andpractice" movement that seeks to enrich the
study of law with the unique intra-discplinarj inszjghts of legalpractice.
Modern democracies today face manj challengingproblems. Law can help
address those problems. Academics andpractionersneed to coordinate
their effbrts along the entire micro-macro legal continuum and at the
dejferent levels of law to innovate more effective legal solutions to these
problems.
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The Micro-MacroLegal Continuum and the Levels of Law

I. INTRODUCTION
One of law's most important functions is solving problems.' The way laws
and lawmakers frame problems, therefore, defines not only the boundaries of what
is considered "inside" or "outside" the problem, but also what is considered a
successful solution.2 Thus, the cognitive framework we employ to solve problems
can affect the nature and quality of our solutions.
A well-established framework in American law is that there is-in the
now-famous words of Judge Harry Edwards-a "disjunction" between the
academic study of law and the practice of law.4 In June 2011, the U.S. Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Roberts agreed with Judge Edwards and observed
that there remains a "great disconnect" between American legal practitioners
and legal academics.
This essay seeks to challenge the "great disconnect" framework with an
alternative holistic framework that examines law in two ways-how legal actors
initially create, revise or analyze law and how law subsequently impacts society.
First, the micro-macro legal continuum demonstrates how the type of law can
affect the legal actors' professional judgment and decision-making. Second,
the tactical, strategic and operational levels of law demonstrate three different
perspectives through which to evaluate law's societal impact. Both concepts are
connected. Although practitioners might focus more on micro law and academics
1
2

3

4
5

See, e.g., Paul Brest & Linda H. Krieger, Lawjers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. REV.
811, 811-12 (1999).
See general, PAUL BiST & LINDA H. KuLGLR, PROBLEM SOLVING, DucIsION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONALJUDGMLNi: A GUIDE CaR LAwYERS AND POLICY MAKLRS 34-42, 70-76,
420-28 (2010) (collecting authorities).
As Brest and Krieger observed, we often are unaware of the limiting effects of our
own frames: A particular frame inevitably provides only one of a number of possible
views of reality and implicitly blocks the consideration of alternative perspectives
with other possible solutions. When you are viewing a situation through a particular
frame, though, it seems to provide a complete picture of reality Indeed, the frame is
often invisible: You have the illusion that you're seeing the world "just as it is," and it
is difficult to imagine that there could be another way to view it. Id. at 35.
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing DisjunctionBetween Legal Educationand the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. Rv. 34 (1992).
Fourth CircuitJudicialConference:A Conversationwith Chief Justice Roberts (C-SPAN television
broadcastJun. 25, 2011), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/FourthCi.
3
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might focus more on macro law, the operational level of law demonstrates that
their efforts are interrelated.
This framework is explored in three parts. Part I describes the micro-macro
legal continuum. Part II then explains how both micro law and macro law can
impact society at a tactical, strategic or operational level. Part III explains how
this holistic view can integrate the study and practice of law. Finally, the essay
concludes with observations on how this holistic framework could contribute to
the intra-disciplinary study of law through another "law and" movement, ironically
called "law and practice."

II. HOW THE TYPE

OF LAW AFFECTS JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING

The micro-macro legal continuum divides law into micro law and macro
law.' This micro-macro distinction parallels the well-established division between
microeconomics and macroeconomics.

Whereas microeconomics addresses

the behaviour of individuals (i.e., producers, consumers, households, firms and
industries within their economic environment and how they respond to changing
conditions),' macroeconomics addresses the aggregate effects of economic
activity (i.e., through regional, national and international measures, such as
inflation, unemployment and the demand and supply of money).'

Although

macroeconomic theories must be linked to microeconomic behaviour, there is no
consensus among economists about either the boundary between microeconomics
and macroeconomics or the nature of their relationship."
6

Cf Mathias M. Siems, LegalOnginaity, 28 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 147, 149-150 (2008);
Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting Macro Theory into Practice, 5 CINICAL
L. REV. 95, 97, 99 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of
ClinicalEducation: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 ANTrocI L.J. 287,
289 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about
Lawyering, 29 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 555, 556 (1980) (all employing a micro-macro

7
8
9
10

law distinction).
This division was first coined by Ragnar Frisch. LiefJohansen, Ragnar Frisch
Contributionsto Economics, 71 SwEDsIH J. ECON. 306 (1969).
JAE K. SHI\ & JOEL G. SILEGEL, MACROECONOMIuCs 3 (2d ed. 2005).
Id.
Abdallah Zouache, On the Microeconomic Foundationsof Macroeconomicsin the Hayek-Keynes
Controvery, 15 J. HIST. OF EcON. TIOUGIT 105, 106 (2008).
4
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There are many definitions of law and this essay seeks to avoid the black
hole question, "what is law?""

Consequently, this essay uses the rather broad

term "legal actors" to represent anyone who formally or informally impacts or
influences law in a democracy-however law may be defined.
Formally, all three democratic branches of the government contain legal
actors: elected legislators (and their staff) who enact statutes; judges (and the
lawyers representing both sides in a litigation) who decide cases and publish
judicial opinions; and the executive (and its cabinet) which implements statutes
and publishes administrative regulations and decisions, are all legal actors.
There are also informal legal actors who influence the law. For example,
lobbyists (and the organisations or causes they represent) influence the legislators
and the executive through political endorsements and campaign contributions.
Community activists (and the people they lead) influence elections through
grassroots organising and public protest. Even reactionary movements without
clearly defined goals or organisers, like the worldwide Occupy Wall Street
Movement,1 2 appear to be influencing national policy. Pundits and academics
who publicly critique existing law also have left their indelible mark on law.
The porous boundary between micro law and macro law is the legal actors'
role and accompanying constraint upon their judgment and decision-making.
Whereas legal actors practicing micro law are more limited in their judgment
and decision-making, legal actors engaging in macro law can exercise greater
independent judgment and decision-making.

1. Micro Law
Micro law is the type of law where a legal actor's judgment is constrained by
her professional role. Instead of relying upon her own independent judgment
regarding how best to solve a particular legal problem, the legal actor must defer
to professional and ethical considerations that limit her range of available options.
11
12

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALL L.J. 586, 616 (2010).
See generally Alasdair S. Roberts, Containing the Outrage: How Police Power Tames the
Occupy Movement, BOSTON RFV. (Nov. 14, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1959542.
5

Vol. 8 (2)

Socio-Legal Review

2012

In short, legal actors practicing micro law are accountable to third parties.
A legal actor practicing micro law might represent clients in a particular lawsuit
or constituents who elected her to enact a particular statute. She therefore must
attempt to attain their objectives-even if she personally disagrees with those
objectives-if she wants to avoid malpractice for failing to uphold the attorneyclient relationship," or if she wants to be re-elected to public office. 4 Likewise, a
judge ideally is supposed to exercise judicial restraint," follow binding precedent,
even if she personally disagrees with that precedent," and restrict her decisionmaking to the specific case or controversy before her," or face public reversal by
a reviewing court (or, if she is a member of the highest court in the jurisdiction,
face public criticism of her reasoning from her fellow justices)."
Such third-party accountability is the clearest with a discrete law or issue.
For example, a client will know whether her lawyer represented her interests
appropriately in a particular lawsuit. Likewise, a voter can easily learn whether
an elected legislator or executive passed a promised piece of legislation or shared
the voter's views on a particular hot-button issue.
Thus, not surprisingly, micro law-like microeconomics-typically examines
individual legislation, executive action, administrative rulemaking, litigation and
transactions, whereas macro law-like macroeconomics-examines law more
collectively. Furthermore, although individual micro laws in aggregate constitute
macro law-again like microeconomics and macroeconomics" 13
14

15
16
17

18
19

the boundary

See, e.g., MODEL Ruis OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 -1.18 (2010) (describing the attorney
client relationship and the duty of zealous representation).
Under the theory of retrospective voting, voters in a democracy retrospectively determine
at election time whether the executive and legislative branches have best represented their
interests and vote accordingly. MORRIS FIORIN\, RETROSPECTynIV VOTING IN AMERNICN
N\TION.r EiECTIONS (1981).
See general Symposium, Can OnginalismBe Reconciled with Precedent?, 22 CONsT. CO IENT.
257 (2005).
See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the CrystalBal: Reflections on the Standards State
judges Should Use To Ascertain FederalLaw, 40 WMu. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1190 (1999).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992);
United States v. Torres, 182 E3d 1156, 1164 n.2 (10th Cit. 1999); CoDE OF CONDUCT
Fox UNrIm STrMns JUDGES CANON 3 (2009).
Elected judges also face the same re-election concerns as legislators.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
6
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between micro and macro law varies according to the context. Moving from micro
law to macro law, the continuum ranges from a discrete law or issue to a specific
area of legal doctrine' (e.g., American securities law) through all legal doctrine
21
(e.g., all American law) to general law (e.g., theories of general jurisprudence
that seek to transcend the legal doctrine of any particular nation).

2. Macro Law
In contrast, macro law is the type of law where a legal actor's judgment
is less constrained by her professional role. Legal actors engaging macro law
can, therefore, exercise much more independent judgment than when creating
micro law. Macro law is concerned with systemic issues beyond the scope of
individualised decision-making.
In short, legal actors engaging macro law are less accountable to third
parties. Although the precise line between micro law and macro law is unclear
(hence the need for a continuum), legal actors at the highest national or
international level, such as the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
U.S. President, often engage macro law when deciding issues of national policy.
Even these top-level legal actors, however, still regularly create, critique and
revise micro law.
Perhaps the most familiar legal actors engaging macro law are law professors
writing academic legal scholarship.2 2 Because a law professor enjoys academic
freedom, 2 3 she has fewer constraints on her professional judgment than a legal
20

21

22

23

"Legal doctrine" is defined as "the various sources of law (precedents, statutes, constitutions)
that constrain or otherwise guide the practitioner, decision maker and policymaker." Edwards,
supra note 4, at 43. See also Richard A. Posner, The PresentSituation in Lega/Schoarship, 90 Y/9N L.J.
1113, 1113-14 (1981) (for a similar definition). Legal doctrine is meant to encompass law as it is
actually used on a daily basis by legal practitioners in all branches of a democratic government.
A theory of general jurisprudence assumes "that there are certain elements and concepts
common to all legal systems," and attempts to identify and analyze them. BRI.AN Z.
TAMANNATIA, A GFNFRAL JURTSPRUDE7NCE, OF LAW AND SO cIFTY xiii (2001).
There are, of course, ample law review articles about micro law as well. Legal scholarship,
however, writes more about macro law than most other forms of micro law practitioner
instrumental writing such as briefs and memoranda of law.
See generally Matthew R. Krell, The Ivory Tower Under Siege:A ConstitutionalBasisforAcademic
Freedom, 21 Gno. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 259 (2011).
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actor creating micro law.24 A law review article-what Pierre Schlag calls "air
law"2 5-is

"written on behalf of no client, in no pending case, without a court

date and addressed to no one in particular."26
As exhibited by the difference between a legal brief and a law review
article, micro and macro law employ different forms of legal analysis. Both
have substantially different evidentiary burdens, admissible authority and
preferred methods of reasoning. Because micro law is more specific than
macro law, micro law has a much less onerous evidentiary burden than macro
law which, because of its broader scope, is much harder to prove. Likewise,
micro law's admissible authority is usually restricted to much more formalist
binding precedent and previous legal decisions than macro law which, because
of its broader scope, is more open to creative, non-legal sources. Finally,
micro law generally employs greater inductive reasoning, where "the claim
is that the premises provide some grounds or support for the truth of the
conclusion," 2 and macro law generally employs greater deductive reasoning,
where "the claim is that the premises, if true, provide conclusive grounds for
the truth of the conclusion."2 8
A rather stark illustration of the difference between the relatively
unconstrained judgment of a law professor analysing macro law versus the more
constrained judgment of a legal practitioner creating micro law is the failed
nomination of Professor Lani Guinier for Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, U.S. Department of Justice. As a law professor, Guinier had written
extensive legal scholarship about race-scholarship that she later believed was
blatantly mischaracterised to destroy her nomination.2 9
24
25
26
27
28
29

See supra Part I.A.
Pierre Schlag, Spam jurisprudence,Air Lax, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A
Report on the State of the Art), 97 Guo. L.J. 803, 813 (2009).
Richard A. Posner, The State of LegalSpholarshp Today: A Comment on Schlag, 9 Guo. L.J.
845, 845 (2009).
DOUGLAs LIND, LoGTC AND LEGAL REASONING 6 (2d ed. 2007).
Id.
Lani Guinier, Who's Afraid of Lani Guinier?, N.Y MAG., Feb. 27, 1994, at 44
(commenting that "[]ooking back, it is remarkable how I could so easily be labeled a
Quota Queen by so many, despite the complexity of my essays").
8

The Micro-Macro Legal Continuum and the Levels of Law

As head of the Civil Rights Division, Guinier would have been charged with
leading the agency that "serves as the federal government's public and internal
voice on civil rights, representing the United States in the nation's courts and
serving as an authority and resource for other government agencies on issues
relating to discrimination.""

A large part of Guinier's job would have been

overseeing the micro law litigation brought by the Division in U.S. federal courts.
Then-SenatorJoe Biden, Chair of the SenateJudiciary Committee, law school
graduate and future Vice-President of the United States, 31 commented on the
impact of Guinier's scholarship upon her confirmation hearing:
If she can come up here and explain herself, convince people that what she wrote wasjust
a lot of academic musing, who knows? . .. I suppose itF conceivable that she could be
confirmed. If she comes up here and says she believes in the theories that she sets out in her
articles and is going to pursue them, not a Shot.32

Simply put, a law professor engaging macro law has greater freedom to express
her own personal beliefs without worrying about micro law judgment constraints.13
Table 1 summarizes key differences between micro law and macro law.
TABLE

1: MICRo LAW VERSUS MACRO LAw

Characteristic

Micro Law

Macro Law

Legal Actor's Judgment

Most constrained by third

Less constrained by third

parties

parties.

involved in

the

creation or revision of a

particular micro law.

30
31
32
33

Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARv. L. & Por'Y RE. 211,
212 (2008).
Vice PresidentJoeBiden, http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/administration/vice-president-biden
(last visited 10 February 2012.).
Robert C. Post, Lani Guinier,Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11 CONsT.
CONIMENT. 185, 185 (1994) (citation omitted).
Although academic freedom is conducive to creativity, the exigencies of practice might
lead to more creative and more realistic solutions as well. Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers
of the Ivory Tower: The Oblgation of Law Professors to Engage in the Practice of Law, 50 Lov.
L. RFV. 623, 644 (2004).
9
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Single legal action.

Multiple
often

legal
actions,
considered
from

an aggregate or collective
perspective.
Evidentiary Burden

Less

onerous

because

Admissible Authority

burden

restricted

to

More

onerous

because

of

a

burden
broader

specific context.

applicable scope.

More restricted to formalist
binding precedent and

Less restricted by binding
precedent and previous

previous decisions.

decisions.

Less

open to creative, non-legal

More open to

creative, non-legal sources.

sources.
Reasoning

Greater

inductive

reasoning.

III.

Greater

deductive

reasoning.

THREE LEVELS OF LAW

Both types of law-micro law and macro law-can impact society in three
different ways. These three different ways are reflected in three levels of law:
tactical, strategic and operational. These three levels were originally conceived by
19 th century German military planners, further developed by 1920s Soviet military
theoreticians,3 and perfected in the 1980s American AirLand Battle Doctrine.
Today, all U.S. military services recognise the same three levels in warfare. 6 These
three levels are considered "interdependent" and "there are no finite limits or
boundaries between them."" Moreover, business literature has already adopted
these three levels to management." Definitions taken from the current U.S. Army

34
35

MILAN N. VEGO, OPE1TlONAL WAFAR

36
37

AVcoo, supra note 34, at 17 n.1.

2 nn.1, 2 (2000).
Frederick W Kagan, OperationalArt,JOINT FORCE. Q., Autumn/Winter 2001-02, at 111.
HLADQUARIERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE

Awmy (U.S.),

FIELD MANUAL

3.0:

OPERiTIONs

2-2

(2001).
38

See, e.g., Derek Thomason, Strategic, Tactical,Operational,MFG.

ENG'R, June July 2004, at
34 (describing three levels of demand management-strategic, tactical and operational).
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Field Manual 3.0: Operations39 will be used to explain these concepts' application
to law and society. Although law has often been analogised to warfare,4 there
are many aspects of law, such as transactional law, that do not resemble warfare.
The military analogies herein are only used because the military study of warfare
invented the concept of operational art.
While the tactical and strategic levels of law are perhaps different names for
familiar legal concepts, the rationale for importing these military planning terms
into law is the novel concept of operational art. Operational art appears to be
a much needed, yet foreign concept to American law. 41 The operational level of
law links practitioners and academics to argue that any perceived "disconnect"
between the two is a false one. But before this essay can explore the operational
level of law, it must explain the tactical and strategic levels.

1. Tactical Level of Law
First, the tactical level of war is "the realm of close combat, where friendly
forces are in immediate contact and use direct and indirect fires to defeat or
39
40

41

See HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (U.S.), supra note 37.
See, e.g., Richard E Devlin, Law, Postmodernismand Resistance: Rethinking the Signlicance of the
Irish Hunger Strike, 14 WINDSoR YB. ACCES To JusTI. 3,35 (1994) ("law is war"); Oliver R.
Goodenough, CulturalReplication Theory andLaw: ProximateMechanisms Make a Dference,
30 VT. L. REv. 989, 990 (2006) (analogising the evolution of law to memetics, the natural
selection of cultural elements).
Although scholars have discussed the operational level of law in other contexts, the
author is not aware of any prior attempt to apply the operational level to the concept
of law itself. For example, the operational level has been used with regard to legal
practitioners' practical concerns. See, e.g., RiCICARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMAITISMa, AND
DFMtOCRA-\CY 41 (2003) (arguing that certain legal theory "has little to contribute to law
at the operational level"). The operational level has also been used to explain the law
of land warfare as applied to military operations. See, e.g., Laurie E. Blank & Amos N.
Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationali ing the Law of Armed Conflict in New
Warfare, 1 HARV. N \t'L SECurrTY J. 45 (2010); Center for Law and Military Operations
(CLAMO), The Judge Advocate General's School, PreparationTpsfor the Deployment of
a Brigade OperationalLaw Team (BOLT), ARMfY LAw., July 2001, at 51; H. Wayne Elliott,
Sjstemi5ing OperationalLaw,ARrY LAx., Nov. 1992, at 32. Finally, the operational level
has been used to describe government legal liability. See, e.g., Lee v. Department of
Health and Rehab. Servs., 698 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1997); City of St. Petersburg v Collom,
419 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1982) (government liability for "operational-level" functions). See
also Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards,and FracturedCourts, 35 OKIA. Cn U. L. RFV. 559
(2010) (operational standards in divided U.S. Supreme Court opinions).
11
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destroy enemy forces and to seize or retain ground."4 2 Military tactics are focused
upon fire and manoeuvre to destroy the enemy right in front of you. Although
many small-unit tactical engagements can have an aggregate effect beyond each
individual tactical engagement (i.e., winning a battle that might lead to winning
a war), the tactical level is solely concerned with winning the battle going on in
front of you right now.
In a similar fashion, the tactical level of law focuses solely upon the people
directly impacted by a particular law and includes the legal actors advocating or
opposing the specific law and those immediately affected by the specific law.
The particular law often explicitly names the people immediately affected. This
tactical level is unconcerned with the law's precedential or systemic effects beyond
the people immediately involved. In other words, even though laws often have
precedential or systemic effects, the tactical lens ignores those effects to focus
solely upon the people directly affected by the law. Another way to look at this
tactical level is to determine the target audience of the particular law, "Who
specifically are you trying to benefit or burden with this law?"43
Here are some simple illustrative examples by the branch of democratic
government. With legislation, the tactical level is the legal actors seeking to pass
or block the particular piece of legislation and the people specifically named in
the legislative purpose of the statute. For example, the tactical level of a welfarereform law would be the legal actors advocating for and against the new law and
the target audience, people on welfare. With litigation, the tactical level is the
parties in the lawsuit. For example, the tactical level of a personal injury lawsuit
would be the plaintiff widow and the defendant employer. With a transaction,
the tactical level would be the two parties who made the deal and perhaps the
competitors who sought to stop the deal from happening. For example, the
tactical level of a merger would be companies A and B that merged and another
company C that had initially sought to merge with company A but failed to close
the deal. With administrative rule making, the tactical level would be the legal
42
43

ERS, DEPARIENT OF TiHE ARSiN (U.S.), supra note 37, at 2-5.
See Will Rhee, Entitled to Be Heard:Improving Evidence-Based Policy Making Through Audience
and Public Reason, 85 IND. L.J. 1315, 1318 (2010).
HEADQUA
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actors who supported or opposed the new rule and the target audience of the
new rule. For example, the tactical level of new mine safety regulations would
be the energy enthusiasts who oppose the regulations, the environmental and
labour agencies who support the new regulations, the relevant federal and state
regulatory agencies, and the target audience, mine owners and workers.
As these examples demonstrate, the tactical level is most applicable to micro
law. Nevertheless, macro law can also be viewed from the strategic level of law.
This is most common with the deductive application of a macro legal principle
to a specific micro law instance. 44 For example, the concept of due process
and having an opportunity to be heard before facing civil penalties arguably is
an established macro legal principle in American civil law 45 The tactical level
of this macro law might be its pedestrian application in countless "easy" micro
law cases. 46 The level of law most applicable to such macro law, however, is the
strategic level of law.

2. Strategic Level of Law
Second, in marked contrast to the tactical level is the strategic level. The
strategic level of war is "that level at which a nation, often as a group of nations,
determines national and multinational security objectives and guidance and
develops and uses national resources to accomplish them.

.

. The National

Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military
objectives." 47 When the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz famously labelled
war as "politics by other means,"48 he was referring to the strategic level.
As the familiar phrase "strategy and tactics" indicates, the strategic level of
war and the tactical level of war are different sides of the same coin. Whereas
A GUIDEO

44

See, e.g.,

45

8-14 (3d ed. 1997) (explaining the ratio decidendilegal principle in common law reasoning).
See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

RUGGEROJ. ALDISLu,

LOGIC FOR LAw\xYLRS:

o CLEAR LEGAL THINKING

306 (1950).
46
47
48

See, e.g., H.L.A. HA', THE CONCEPT

LAw 119-20 (2d ed. 1994).
(U.S.), supranote 37.
CARL VoN CLASTTz, ON WAR 87 (Michael E. Howard & Peter Paret eds., trans., 1976)
[1832].

HEADQUA
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the strategic level is concerned with broader foreign policy and national security
implications beyond the fire and manoeuvre necessary to win a single tactical
military engagement, the tactical level is solely concerned with the fire and
manoeuvre necessary to win the specific military battle and is unconcerned
with the broader implications of the battle.49 These two levels of course are
interdependent" because the primary means of attaining strategic military
objectives during war are tactical battles.
In a similar fashion, the strategic level of law and the tactical level of law are
different sides of the same coin. Whereas the strategic level is concerned with
the broader policy implications beyond passing new legislation, winning a lawsuit,
closing a deal or announcing a new executive order, the tactical level is solely
concerned with passing the new legislation, winning the lawsuit, closing the deal or
announcing the new executive order, and is unconcerned with the broader policy
implications of these new laws. The two levels are also interdependent because
the primary means of attaining strategic legal objectives is through creating or
revising law on the tactical level.
As these examples demonstrate, the strategic level is most applicable to macro
law. Nevertheless, micro law can also be viewed from the strategic level of law.
This is most common when large private or public organisations attempt to use
micro law to attain strategic objectives. For example, when the U.S. Congress
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996" authorising American states not
to recognise other states' same-sex marriages, a micro law federal statute was used
for a strategic purpose, to intrude on the traditional state regulation of marriage
to discredit the validity of same-sex marriages and to bolster the concept of
traditional marriage between a man and a woman.52 Two other infamous examples
of micro law attaining strategic objectives are the civil rights cases Cooper v.Aaron13

49

50
51
52
53

Vuno, supra note 34, at 1 ("Strategy is not concerned with actual fighting").
Hr \DOu\RThRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (U.S.), supranote 37.
Codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2006).
See generally Clifford J. Rosky, Perry . Schwargenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage
Law, 53 ARIZ. L. Rjv. 913 (2011).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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and Korematsu v. UnitedStates.5 4 While both concerned racial discrimination, Cooper
prevented the state of Arkansas from subverting American school desegregation
whereas Korematsu upheld the forced internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II.
First, in Cooper, the only opinion signed by all nine members of the U.S.
Supreme Court,"5 the Court observed that "[a]s this case reaches us it raises
questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of
government."" In response to the Court's Brown v. Boardof Education decisions"
desegregating the nation's public schools, the Arkansas General Assembly
amended its state constitution "to oppose 'in every Constitutional manner the
Un-constitutional [Brown] desegregation decisions""' and enacted two micro laws
"relieving school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools"
and "establishing a State Sovereignty Commission." 5 9 When the Little Rock,
Arkansas school district sought to enforce a federal court desegregation order
by allowing nine black students to attend the previously all-white Central High
School, the Arkansas Governor unilaterally-without a request from the school
district-ordered the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the black students
from attending the high school.6 0
In response to this unprecedented post-Civil War challenge to the supremacy
of federal government power, the United States, through the U.S. Attorney
General, entered the case as amis curiae upon the request of the district court
judge and asked the district court "to enjoin the Governor of Arkansas and officers
of the Arkansas National Guard from further attempts to prevent obedience to
the court's order.""1 After a hearing, the district court granted the injunction. 62
The U.S. President subsequently federalised the Arkansas National Guard and
54
55
56
57

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
358 U.S. 1 at 4 (1958).
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

58

Id. at 9.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 9-11.

61
62

Id. at 11-12.
Id.
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ordered them to cooperate with federal troops dispatched to the area to oversee
the desegregation of Central High School.

Finally, the Court clearly explained

how the Arkansas legislature and governor were bound to obey the Court's
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in Brown.64

Cooper demonstrated in dramatic fashion how micro law-in this instance,
the straightforward implementation of a higher court's binding precedent by a
lower court-can achieve strategic objectives. From a formalist perspective, there
was no reason for Cooper to be controversial or even to require another decision
by the US. Supreme Court-let alone one issued by all members of the Court in
an exceptional demonstration of unity. The individual parties involved, however,
turned this simple case into a serious constitutional conflict. Both the Arkansas
governor and legislature and the U.S. federal judiciary and President employed the
confrontation surrounding this micro law to ultimately reaffirm the supremacy
of the federal Constitution and the federal government over states' rights.
Second, in perhaps one of its worst reasoned opinions, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the forced internment of Japanese-American citizens and naturalised
aliens in the infamous Korematsu case.65 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
never overturned this precedent, creative micro law from the U.S. Congress, the
U.S. district court and the U.S. President has managed to discredit Korematsu at a
strategic level.
Taking the lead to remedy this long-standing injustice, the U.S. Congress
established, through a federal statute," the Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians in 1980. Congress provided the Commission with
hearing and subpoena power.6

In its final Report, the Commission "concluded

that 'broad historical causes which shaped"' the exclusion and detention of
Japanese-Americans "'were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
63
64

Id. at 12.
Id. at 17.

65
66

323 U.S. at 217-18.
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Pub.L. No.
96-317, § 2, 94 Stat. 964 (1980).
Korematsu v. United States, 584 E Supp. 1406, 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

67
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leadership.' As a result, 'a grave injustice was done to American citizens and
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any
probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the
United States during World War II.'"' Five years later, the U.S. Congress passed
the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,6" formally apologising for the Japanese internment
and providing $20,000 in reparations for each surviving victim.
Following the Congress' lead, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, the trial court where the original Korematsu case had been
filed, granted Fred Korematsu's petition for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his
conviction for well-documented government misconduct in his original case.
Although not confessing any error, the United States joined the petitioner in
asking that his conviction be dismissed.

2

Finally, in granting the petition and

vacating the conviction, the district court recognised that Korematsuunfortunately
remained a valid-albeit limited-precedent."
Finally, in 1998, President Clinton followed the court and the Congress by
awarding Fred Korematsu the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his courage in
opposing such injustice.7 On May 20, 2011, Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal
issued a press release confessing that the Solicitor General deliberately suppressed
exculpatory evidence from the Korematsu case."
Like Cooper, the remarkable series of legislative, judicial and executive nicro
law actions in response to Klorematsu also demonstrate how micro law can
68

Id. at 1416-17 (quoting

69
70
71
72
73
74
75

PERSONAL JUST(I

DENIED:

RLP(RT OF THE COMNISSION ON

18 (1982)).
50 U.S.C. § 1989b-1 to b-4(a) (1988).
Kathleen A. Bergin, Authenticating American Democracy, 26 PACF L. RVN. 397, 434 n.202
(2006).
584 E Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1420.
See Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Internment:Special Registration and Other Human Rights
Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the UnitedStates, 29 Vi. L. RLv. 407, 414 n.13 (2005).
Neal Katyal, Confession of Error:The Solicitor General1'MistakesDuringtheJapanese-American
Internment Cases, TTIE JUSTIFC BTLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/
archives/1346.
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creatively achieve strategic objectives. As the unusually dramatic nature of these
examples shows, it is rare for one micro law to achieve such strategic significance.
A solitary micro law usually will not have relevance at the strategic level. The
combined, cumulative effect of many related micro laws, however, can often
have strategic significance. Micro law aspires for strategic significance through
the operational level of law-the bridge between the tactical and strategic levels.
3. Operational Level of Law
Finally, the operational level of war "links the tactical employment of forces
to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art-the use
of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization,
integration, and conduct of ... a series of tactical actions . . ., coordinated in time
and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an
operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially under
a common plan and are controlled by a single commander.""6 Because wars can
only be fought at the tactical level, yet they ultimately are waged to achieve strategic
objectives, the "[t]actical perspective is too narrow, and strategic perspective is too
broad, to ensure the most effective use of military and nonmilitary sources of
national power in the accomplishment of strategic objectives. The principal role
of operational art is to .

. .

'orchestrate' the employment of military forces and

nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic and operational objectives.""
A simple example of how a series of tactical military engagements attained
the operational level of war is the U.S. Task Force Kingston in the Korean War.
On November 21, 1950, 21-year-old Second Lieutenant (the lowest U.S. Army
officer rank") Bob Kingston and his platoon of 33 soldiers were ordered to
reconnoiter and, if possible, take a Korean city.:
76

77
78
79

DEPARTMENT OF TH1E ARNY (U.S.), supra note 37.
VTno, supra note 34, at 1.
See Commissioned Officer Rank, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/theorderlyroom/1/
blofficerrank.htm (last visited 4 July 2012).
Martin Blumenson, Task Force Kingston, ARiMuY MLG., Jan. 2001, http://www3.ausa.
org/webint/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KGRG-6FJHGD. See also HuDQuAiR'LR,
DEPARTMENT OF TTIE ARMrY (U.S.), FIETID MANUAL 22-100: ARMY LFADERSIiP 4-13 to 4-14
(1999) (describing Task Force Kingston).
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What began as a rather routine tactical mission, over the next eight
days evolved into a series of successive tactical engagements with significant
operational, if not strategic, significance.

Because of Lieutenant Kingston's

demonstrated effectiveness, his commanders kept on attaching greater resources
to his platoon and ordered him to continue his advance towards the Chinese
border.
By November 28, 1950, what had become Task Force Kingston
comprised of not only Lieutenant Kingston and his 33-man platoon, but
also additional soldiers, two tanks, three Jeep-mounted machine guns, three
trucks with four .50-caliber machine guns, four trucks with twin 40-mm
antiaircraft guns, heavy mortars, an engineer platoon, an artillery forward
observer (to direct and adjust artillery fire), a tactical air controller (to direct
air strikes) and a bulldozer (to clear road blocks). Lieutenant Kingston now
commanded 111 men, including nine officers of a higher rank-one major,
three captains, and five first lieutenants." On November 28, 1950, Task
Force Kingston achieved its strategic objective, becoming one of two U.S.
units to reach the Chinese border on the Yalu River."

In doing so, Task

Force Kingston had advanced all the way through to the end of enemy
North Korean territory.
In a similar fashion, the operational level of micro law is how micro law
attempts to influence macro law. The operational level links the tactical and
strategic levels of law. Because employing micro law on the tactical level to
influence macro law on the strategic level takes creativity, the ability to attain the
operational level is often called operational art. This concept of operational art
appears to be absent from current American conceptions of laW.8 2 Without an
understanding of operational art, it is not surprising that the "great disconnect"
paradigm treating legal practitioners and legal academics as dichotomous
predominates.

80
81
82
83

3

See supra note 78.
Blumenson, supra note 79.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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In a democracy, macro law can only be changed or sustained through micro
84

law.

Operational art uses micro law to change or sustain macro law. Although

operational art is most common to legal actors who seek to use micro law to
change society," operational art is also necessary for legal actors who wish to
thwart such change and thereby preserve the status quo. Law rarely stays stagnant.
Operational art is an art because there are elements of unpredictability, chance
and improvisation in operational legal efforts. Like Task Force Kingston and its
higher commanders, legal actors employing micro law operationally often have
no idea how their efforts will ultimately turn out. They simply seek to catalyze a
chain of events that hopefully will result in-depending on their desire to advance
or thwart legal change-significant or minimal macro legal change. Much of the
final outcome is beyond their control.
As the micro law efforts surrounding the Cooper 6 decision demonstrate,
when legal actors seek to use micro law to achieve strategic objectives through
operational art, there often are opposing forces seeking to achieve different
strategic objectives. The Arkansas governor and legislature in Cooperapparently
unsuccessfully attempted to use their own micro law to achieve their strategic
objectives of discrediting Brown and establishing the macro legal principle that
a state can refuse to enforce what it perceives as an unconstitutional federal
encroachment of its power.
Although operational art aspires to strategic objectives, it often falls short
of them. Operational objectives are objectives that are beyond the scope of
mere tactical concerns, yet arguably have not yet achieved strategic significance.
For example, as demonstrated by Cooper, with the benefit of hindsight, Brown"
now can be considered a micro law that achieved strategic significance. Brown &
triumph, however, was the product of decades of previous National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund "impact" litigation,
84 In a dictatorship, a dictator ostensibly could change even macro law through autocratic fiat.
85 U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) offers a good definition of such legal

86
87

change efforts, a "non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law." FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that arguably achieved operational objectives which paved the path for Brown's
eventual strategic success. 88
Considering the operational level of law also raises a provocative research
question, what is the relationship between individual and collective legal action,
between micro and macro law? Does an individual micro legal action-a single
lawsuit, a single statute, a solitary administrative regulation, or a specific executive
order-have a macro legal effect? If yes, how much? Does such effect vary
according to the character or nature of the particular micro law? Or is the converse
true? Does macro law affect micro law? If yes, how much? Does such effect
vary according to the character or nature of macro law?
Similarly, how much impact, if any, can an individual legal actor's efforts
make upon macro law and society? For example, does individual attorney skill
really matter or are legal outcomes more predetermined by larger social forces?
Can a more skilful attorney obtain a more favourable outcome for her client in a
criminal lawsuit than a less skilful attorney?89 Or are all legal actors just bourgeois
instruments of oppression?" Table 2 summarises all three levels of law.
TABLE

2: THE

Level of Law

THREE LEVELS OF LAw

Primary Focus

Complementary
Level of Law

Tactical

People directly impacted by

Converse of the strategic level.

the law. To include the legal
actors advocating or opposing
the law, and the law's target
audience. Typically micro law's
focus.
88

89

90

See hLu V TUSHNTiI,

THE NAACP's LEGAL STITEGY AGAINST SLGEGLC
DEDUCcYION,
1925-1950 (2d ed. 2004); GENNA RAu McNEIL, GRouNDovolu: CHARLES HA\uLrON
HOUSTON AND TIIE STRUGGLE FOR CmI RIcTITS (1984).
See Jennifer B. Shinall, Skping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on Trial
Outcomes, 63 VAND. L. RFV. 267 (2010); David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck
of the Draw: Using Random CaseAssignmentto InvestiateAtorneyAbility, 74 U. CH. L. Rv.
1145 (2007).
See Duncan Kennedy, LegalEducationand the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc.
591, 591-92 (1982).

21

Vol. 8 (2)

Strategic

2012

Socio-Legal Review

The

broader

implications

policy

beyond

Converse of the tactical level.

the The primary means of attaining

people directly impacted by the

strategic objectives, however, is

law. Typically macro law's focus.

through creation or revision of
law on a tactical level.

Operational

Links

the

tactical

strategic levels.

and Above

Operational

the

Operational

tactical

level.

objectives

are

art is the employment of micro

intermediate objectives that are

law with the goal of achieving

beyond tactical objectives, but

strategic

objectives

and below strategic objectives.

influencing macro law.

IV. A

HOLISTIC VIEW OF LAW

Having explained this alternative holistic framework, the essay will now use
this new framework to critique the "great disconnect" framework that treats the
practice and study of law as two independent, largely unrelated enterprises.
1. Integrating the Practice and Study of Law
Legal practitioners and legal academics are more akin to colleagues with
different areas of specialisation and accordingly different levels of constraint upon
their professional judgment, than diametric opposites. Although practitioners and
academics generally do gain expertise through greater experience in certain activities
such as creating or revising micro law or writing scholarship about macro law, 1 the
same could be said about legal actors with different areas of specialisation.92
Conceptually, there is no reason why a legal actor cannot be both an academic
and a practitioner at the same time, or specialize in one or the other at different
91

92

See PAUL J. ZwmR, SUPERVISORY AND LEA\DERSHIP SKILLS IN THE MODu'u LAw Pluctic
26-28 (2006).
For example, transactional academics or practitioners might have greater expertise with
drafting, interpreting and critiquing contracts than litigation academics or practitioners,
but such a difference in specialization and experience does not render either less of an
academic or practitioner than the other. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, The Modern Approach
to Counseling and AdvocacyEspecial in Commercial Transactions,46 Cormt. L. REV. 167,
168 (1946).
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times of her career." As the micro-macro legal continuum and operational legal
art demonstrate, a legal actor can create micro law or affect macro law at the same
time or at different times in her career.
Indeed, both legal practitioners and legal academics are probably well aware
of counterexamples that transcend such over-simplistic characterisation.

For

example, clinical and skills professors have for long successfully straddled both
the practice and academic worlds.94 Not only have legal practitioners authored
innovative legal scholarship," but also legal academics have become renowned
legal practitioners.

6

Moreover, some legal doctrinal concepts that practitioners

today take for granted were first invented or popularized by legal scholarship.9
Likewise, legal practitioners have inspired new legal scholarship.98
93
94
95

96

97

98

Accord Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical
Education, 75 MINN. L. Rv. 1599, 1601 n.3 (1991).
See generally, e.g., J.P. Ogilvy with Karen Czapanskiy, ClinicalLegalEducation:An Annotated
Bibliography (thirdedition), 12 CIINICA iL. REV. 101, 248 (2005).
Judges also have authored innovative scholarship. Some of the most cited legal scholars
of all time-including Judge Richard Posner, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Judge
Guido Calebresi, Judge Frank Easterbrook and Justice Felix Frankfurter-are or were
practicing jurists. Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409,
424 tbl.6 (2000). While these judges may have authored much of their scholarship as
law professors-except for Justice Holmes, who was a law professor for only months,
THE C\NON OF AmL1\
N LEL;'w THOUGHT 21 (David Kennedy & William W Fisher
III eds., 2006) - the point is that there are people, obviously capable of producing
quality scholarship, who chose to practice law.
Some well-established legal academics-such as Erwin Chemerinsky and Lawrence
Tribe-are also renowned for practicing law. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?
107 MICH. L. Rev. 881, 888 (2009); Vanessa Gregory, IndeJnsible, AmI. PROSPECT, Jan.
1, 2011, at All. At different times in their career, some lawyers rotate between the
academy and practice.
See, e.g., Kennedy & Fisher, supranote 95, at 9; 47 (citing Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YAiEU L.J. 16 (1913)) (the concept of
rights, duties, powers, liabilities, immunities, disabilities, privileges and "no-rights"); 85,
90 (quoting Robert Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53 HARV. L. RIv. 1103, 1143
(1940)) (concept of policy arguments to justify legal doctrine); HENRY M. HARI', JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THL LEGAL PRoCEsS 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey
eds., 1994) (concept of a principle or policy underlying every rule and standard); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 H ARV. L. REv. 1685, 1687-88
(1976) (concept of rules versus standards).
Perhaps the best example of legal practice that has catalyzed new legal theory and
academic scholarship is Brown v. Board of Education,. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented,
349 U.S. 294 (1955). As Justice Breyer commented, in the Supreme Court's "finest hour,"
Brown "challenged" the nation's history and "helped to change it." Parents involved in
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Instead of viewing law through oversimplified and biased "practice" or
"academic" lenses, the micro-macro legal continuum and the three levels of law
provide a more subtle, more accurate and more practical picture. In the final
analysis, this holistic paradigm should result in better legal problem-solving.

2. A Holistic View of Legal Problems and Solutions
Legal problems can be analysed more accurately and comprehensively
as micro or macro law at its tactical, strategic or operational levels. Hannah
Arendt has characterised the different purposes of macro law and micro law as
the "old and complicated" conflict between "truth and politics.""

Because it

is not constrained by the expediency of micro law, macro law can seek truth.'
Precisely because it is constrained by such expediency, micro law is limited by
political role."o

Politics, of course, is how micro law is created and revised in

a democracy.
Because micro law is the only way to create or revise law in a democracy,
micro law is paramount to any realistic conception of law. Chief Justice John
Roberts raised a valid concern when he recently commented, "[I]f the Academy
is interested in having an influence on the practice of law, on the development of
law, they would be wise to stop and think, 'Is this area of research going to be of
help to anyone other than other academics?"'

12

For macro law to have relevance

to policy makers and practitioners, it must be connected to micro law. Whether
or not one agrees with the Chief Justice's criticism of academic legal scholarship,
Cmty. Schs. v Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 867 (2007) (Brever, J., dissenting).
Although "[t]raditional legal academic publishing played little or no role in establishing
the theoretical and doctrinal basis for Brown," Rachel E Moran, The Presidents'Messages:
Transformative Scholarship: Legal Academic Knowledge for What?, AALS NFws, Aug. 2009,

at 6, available at http://www.aals.org/services-newsletter-presAugO9.php. The legal
academy has subsequently produced a prodigious amount of legal scholarship theorizing,
lionizing, criticizing and eulogizing Brown. See, e.g., MA\rHA MINow, IN BrOWN S \VuGu
(2010).
99 Post, supranote 32, at 187 (quoting Hannah Arendt, Truth andPolitics,in Bvnnl
N PAsT AND
FUTURE 227 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100 Post, supra note 32, at 186.
101 Post, supra note 32, at 187.
102 See supra note 5.
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his common criticism concerns the content of academic legal scholarship, not
whether academic legal scholarship can ever have relevance to practitioners.
As the famous MacCrate Report on American legal education observed
with its as-of-yet unfulfilled proposal for an American Institute for the Practice
of Law,1 03 practitioners can unquestionably benefit from the serious academic
study of the practice of law. While the question of whether academics currently
fulfils this need is beyond the scope of this essay, there is no question that wellcrafted, relevant academic legal scholarship about micro law could be useful to
practitioners. Practitioners probably would welcome it.
Because macro law can influence micro law deductively and through the
operational level of law, practitioners also can benefit from the study of macro
law-even academic scholarship about macro law that upon first glance might
appear irrelevant to them. Much has been written about how practitioners that
focus solely on micro law and the tactical level of law can become alienated from
the legal profession.10
In some respects, macro law is like religion. Whether or not anyone wants
to discuss macro law, everyone unavoidably has an opinion on it. Even believing
that it is impossible to form an opinion-being agnostic-is, nevertheless, having
an opinion. Likewise, in the light of micro law and macro law's unavoidable and
public impact upon our daily lives, we cannot help but have an opinion about
whether the implicit or explicit rules contained in micro and macro law are wise,
accurate or just." Although the appearance of objectivity is the hallmark of
103

AMERTCAN

BAR

ASSoCTATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVFTLOPMFNT: AN

EDucATION Al CONTINuum, RFPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON Lw SC 10OLS AND nwT PROFESSTON:
NARROWING TIT GAP 337-38 (1992) (popularly known as the "MacCrate Report").

104 See, e.g., Michael A. Wilkinson, Is LawMorally Risky?Aienation,Acceptance and lart' Concept
of Law, 30 OxFoRD J. LEGAL S'iu. 441, 463 (2010) ("Analogous to the claim that the
system of modern capitalist accumulation alienates man from his labour, the system of
modern law alienates man from society and his shared social norms, resulting in a state
of anomie, a reaction to his overexposure to specialized legal norms and increasingly
autonomous systems of regulation.").
105 Accord Cass R. Sunstein, On Legal Theory and Legal Practice, in THEORY AND PRwctice:
Noos XXXVII 268 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995) ("All descriptive
claims about the content of law depend in some important way on ideas about the
right, the good, or both.").
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everyone has a personal opinion about

law, regardless of whether their opinions are made public or kept confidential."
Because ignorance of the law is no excuse for wrongdoing," every person makes
an implicit or explicit value judgment when she decides to follow, ignore or violate law.
Even if a particular law does not affect us personally, we still form opinions about it
because of its impact on others. By obeying micro or macro law, one implicitly or
explicitly supports the status quo. By ignoring or violating micro or macro law, one
implicitly or explicitly prioritises some belief other than fidelity to pre-existing rules.
So a legal actor cannot avoid having an implicit or explicit opinion about law. Because
macro law examines these opinions in pursuit of truth and justice-however those
concepts are defined-every practitioner should care about macro law.
Accordingly, both academics and practitioners can benefit from studying
and practicing both micro and macro law at all three levels of law. Given the
prevalence of the "great disconnect" meme in American law, could academics
and practitioners possibly work together for common tactical, operational and
strategic goals? Yes, through a "law and practice" movement.

V.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS "LAW AND PRACTICE"

The term "law and practice" here is employed with intentional irony because,
through the proliferation of "law ands", legal academics have ironically welcomed
interdisciplinary strangers into their home while maintaining within the walls
of that same home their feud with their legal practitioner siblings. Because the
legal academy and legal practice remain two sides of the same legal profession,
perhaps a more accurate but less descriptive term would have been just "law".
The proliferation of such "law and" scholarship in the American legal academy
reflects a consensus that the study of law "is not to be understood on its own
terms, but requires the application of some method or substance provided by
106 See, e.g., T. Evan Schaeffer, Five Steps Towards Persuasive Writing, 86 lu. B.J. 343, 344 (1998).
107 Cf Mann v Thalacker, 246 E3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Judges are trained to lay
aside personal opinions and experiences when they sit in judgment.").
108 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (stating that the "rule that
'ignorance of the law will not excuse'. . . is deep in our law").
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other disciplines.""

After all, many disciplines other than the legal profession

have long studied micro and macro law."" Underlying all "law and" scholarship is
the assumption that the discipline after the coordinating conjunction can provide
additional insights to the traditional study of law."
As Judge Edwards observed, "'Law and' scholars with true intellectual
confidence would acknowledge the legitimacy of alternative, and complementary,
approaches."112 Law and practice is such an alternative and complementary
approach to other "law and" scholarship. Just as the study of law has been
enriched by the interdisciplinary perspectives of other disciplines,"

the study

of law can be enriched by the unique intra-disciflinaryinsights of legal practice.
The ideas of a law and practice movement and the holistic framework
introduced in this essay undoubtedly require further refinement. In particular, the
implicit and explicit assumptions behind the micro-macro legal continuum and
the three levels of law are ripe for qualitative and quantitative empirical testing.
This essay is intended to be just the first statement in an ongoing dialogue. I
hope to develop both the micro-macro legal continuum and the three levels of
law concepts in future scholarship.
There are many pressing legal issues that require the coordinated efforts of
both academics and practitioners along the entire micro-macro law continuum.
Law and practice encourages practitioners and academics to employ, study, critique
and revise both micro and macro law. Although most legal actors because of
limited time, limited resources or professional necessity will attain greater expertise
in either micro law or macro law, or focus more on the tactical or strategic levels
of law, they can nevertheless collaborate with their professional counterparts.
Finally, the hybrid study and practice of micro and macro law can ultimately result
in more effective legal insights and innovations.
109 Marc Galanter & Mark A. Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 1997 Wis. L.
REv. 375, 376 (1997).
110 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, LegalScholarhip Today, 115 HARV. L. Rv. 1314,1316 (2002).
111 Atord Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law Schoo, 91 MICH. L. Rv.
2167, 2167 (1993).
112 Edwards, supra note 4, at 52.
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